THE PRACTICE IN REVERSING JUDGMENTS N. 0. V.,
AND IN AMENDING THE PLEADINGS IN PENNSYLVANIA.*
I.

REVERSAL OF JUDGMENTS.

A very interesting situation arises when the winning party
in the court below loses in the appellate court, and then wishes
to take his own appeal after the judgment which had been entered
in his favor in the court below is thus reversed.
Suppose, for instance, there is a verdict for the plaintiff
and the court subsequently enters judgment for the defendant,
non obstante qieredicto. The plaintiff then appeals, and the appellate court reverses this judgment and enters judgment on the
verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant may have taken
certain exceptions during the trial, vhich, of course, were not
considered on the appeal, but he has had no chance to have
these rulings passed upon by the higher court because the judgment originally entered below was in his favor, -and he now
wishes to make his exceptions the basis of an appeal. Since the
Act of 1897,1 the unsuccessful party has had only six'months in
which to take an appeal, and by the time the higher 'court has
handed down its decision, more than six months have usually
elapsed since the trial closed.
This question has been before our appellate courts in only
four cases. In all of them the point considered seems to have
been whether the winning party after losing upon the appeal
would be too late to enter his own appeal from the judgment.
The first case after the Act of 1897' was that of Hughes
v. Miller, 192 Pa. 365 (1899). At the trial Miller presented
two defenses, one on the facts, and one on the law. The court
ruled against him on the facts and directed a verdict for the
*This is the third of a series of articles on Pennsylvania Law. The first
was by H. B. Patton, Vol. 58, page 347. The second by Roland B. Foulke,
Vol. 158, page 445. [Ed.]
Act of May 19, 1897, P. L. 68 (Pa.).
(77)
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plaintiff, giving the defendafit exceptions. Subsequently, on the
defense on the law, the court entered judgment for the defendanf non obstante veredicto. Hughes appealed to the Supreme
Court, who reversed the judgment and entered judgment for the
plaintiff on the verdict. The court below had precluded Miller
from going to the jury on his defense on the facts, and yet he
was, of course, prevented from appealing by reason of the entry
of judgment in his favor on the point reserved.
After judgment had been reversed by the Supreme Court,
the question was whether Miller could make his exceptions, as
originally taken in the court below, the subject of an appeal. On
this question the Supreme Court said:
"When this court reversed the judgment non obstante veredicto and entered judgment on the verdict, it only intended to do
what, in the position in which the case then appeared to stand,
the court below should have done. Hitherto, no practical difficulty has arisen in cases like the present. Ordinarily, the judgment of this court has been pronounced while there was still
time for the party winning below, but losing here, to take his
own appeal if he had any grounds for reversal in his favor. But
with the shortening of the time for appeal by the Act of May
I9,1897, P. L. 68, it is manifest that this cannot usually be the
case hereafter. The most convenient practice, therefore, which
will be followed in the future where our attention is called to a
desire for an opportunity for appeal by the winning party below,
in case he should lose here, will be merely to reverse the judgment
and send the record back to the court below to enter such judgment as it should have entered in the first instance. The time
for appeal by a different party will then begin to run from such
judgment, so that no one will be barred without a fair opportunity to be heard. In the present case we have already entered judgment on the verdict and the time for defendant's appeal
has passed."
Thereupon, on a rule to open their previous judgment, the
Supreme Court modified it so as to let the reversal stand, but instead of directing judgment to be- entered on the verdict, they
remitted the record "to the court below for such judgment as
law and justice required."
Several years later the question was raised again, in Hawn
v. Stoler, 22 Pa. Super. Ct. 307 (1903). The plaintiff recovered

OF THE PLEADINGS IN PENNSYLVANIA.

a verdict, and the trial court subsequently entered judgment for
the defendant it. o.v. Upon appeal the Superior Court said:

"The defendant at the argument requested us, in case of a
reversal, to preserve his right to an appeal upon exceptions taken
in the course of the trial in the court below. For this reason, in
view of the fact that it is now too late for the defendant to take
an appeal if judgment were entered by us upon the verdict, we
follow the precedent established by the Supreme Court in Hughes
v. Miller, 192 Pa. 365, and reverse the judgment and remit the
record to the court below with directions to enter such judgment
in accordance with this opinion as law and right may require."
I Six years later, in Hunt v. R. R. Co., 224 Pa. 6io (I9O9),
the Supreme Court delivered the following opinion, which is
quoted in its entirety.
"In this case there was a verdict for plaintiff, judgment non
obstante veredicto for the defendant, and a reversal by this court,
and a direction to the court below to enter judgmnent on the verdict. The defendant now asks for -t modification of our judgment on the theory, apparently, that ic will lose its right to appeal
by lapse of time.
"This is a misapprehension. The order of this court is so
worded that instead of entering the necessary judgment ourselves, we direct the court below to enter it, and the defendant's
right of appeal in the original suit will run from the date of that
judgment so entered."
The question raised by these cases is not as to the propriety
or wisdom of allowing the unsuccessful party his appeal, but
rather why there was any doubt, technically or otherwise, about
his right to have it. In other words, why did the appellate court
have to make special orders under the circumstances?
If the judgment entered by the court on appeal in such a
case should date as of the time of the verdict, then the reason is
clear, for, of course, now that the Act of 1897 has limited the
right of appeal to six months, that period has almost invariably
passed by the time the appellate court render their decision. But
this is not the case. Judgments do not date as of the time of the
verdicts on which they are entered.
If anything were necessary to prove this it would be suffi-
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cient to refer to the cases where rights of action which die with
the person are litigated, such, for instance, as libel. If a plaintiff
brings suit for damages as a result of a libellous publication, recovers a verdict, and then dies before judgment is entered on the
verdict, his estate cannot recover the sum which has been
awarded. To get around this difficulty our courts have had recourse to an ancient English statute 2 and by a special order entered judgment as of a term when the plaintiff was living. 3 In
such case the entry of judgment has generally been delayed by a
rule for a new trial. It is clear that if the judgment dated back
to the verdict, the estate of the decedent could recover on the
judgment, no matter how long after his death it were entered.
Moreover, that the judgment does not date back to the verdict has
4
-4een directly ruled by the Supreme Court in two recent cases.
But a judgment must have some date. If it does not date
back to the verdict, it must date as of the time it is entered. If
it dates as of the time it is entered, why should the appellate
court in the three cases under discussion have felt called upon to
make the rulings which have been quoted? The judgment would
date as of the time the appellate court made their order, and the
losing party would then have six months from that time in which
to take his appeal.
It may be suggested ,that the appellate courts in these cases
have directed the lower courts to enter judgment for the reason
that if the judgment were entered by the appellate courts themselves, there could, of course, be no.appeal from their judgment.
This seems reasonable, but, if it is the real explanation, why have
the appellate courts always placed their rulings upon the ground
that they were preventing the losing party from being barred by
the lapse of time? The language used leaves no doubt upon this
point. The court's anxiety has always been to keep the appellee
within the statute of limitations. This is what they have specifically said and nowhere have they suggested that the reason
I7

Chas.-H, chap. 8..

*Wood v. Boyle, 177 Pa. 620

(i8o6).
4

(1896); Griffith v. Ogle, I Binn (Pa.) 172

Jones v. Coal Company, 227 Pa. 5o9 (igio) ; Rively v. Railway Company,

228 Pa. 9 (igio).
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was that there could be no appeal from a judgment, of the
appellate court. Furthermore, the appeal would not, as a matter
of fact, be taken from the judgment of the appellate court. It
would be an appeal based on exceptions to the rulings of the court
below, which rulings had never been before the appellate court
for consideration.
If the judgment does not date as of the time of the verdict,
and does not date as of the time of the order of the appellate
court, when does it date? This queftion is one of very great importance in connection with the lien of a judgment against a
defendant's real estate. Obviously, the judgment cannot date
back to the time of the verdict, for in that case there would be
a retroactive lien, although before the Act of 1772 ' judgments
apparently did relate back to the first day of the term in which
they were entered. It seems that this statute was copied from
the 15th Section of the Statute of Charles II, but, in spite of the
implication of its language, the uniform practice in Pennsylvania
has always been to consider that the binding effect of .judgments
upon lands dates only from the actual entry of the judgments. 6
By the Act of April

22,

i909, P. L. 103, the entry of bail upon

appeal discharges the lien of a judgment, and, apparently, although the language of the act is not quite clear it is restored
again when the judgment is affirmed and the record remitted. It
is interesting to speculate, in passing, upon the effect on the lien
should the bail, pending the appeal, become bankrupt. This takes
us, however, a little aside from the question.
If it is obvious that a judgment does not date back to the'
verdict it is equally obvious that it cannot date as of the time the
appellate court enters it under, the reasoning of these decisions,
for then the losing party would be entitled to his six months
from the date of that entry to take his appeal, which is all he is
entitled to, at any rate, and the situation therefore would *not
call for any such action as that which was taken in the three
cases cited. And, again, if the appellate court directs the court'
below, to enter the judgment, as was done in those cases, then,
I Smith's Laws (Pa.), 390.
'2

Troub. & H. Pr. 634.
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if the judgment dates as of the time it was entered by the court
below, why should the appellate court be careful to state that
this would save the defendant from being barred by the statute
of limitations, because, so far as the statute is concerned, he
would not be barred by that in any event, no matter by what
court the judgment was entered, unless the judgment dated back
to the date of the verdict.
The most recent case on this subject is that of Hardencourt
v. Iron Company,

225

Pa. 381 (19o9).

In this case there was

a verdict for the plaintiff, and two rules taken by the defendant,
one for a new trial and one for judgment n. o. v. The last rule
was made absolute, and an appeal was taken by the plaintiff. The
Supreme Court said:
"Our attention has been called to the aesire ot the appellee
to have an opportunity to appeal if the assignment of error should
be sustained. In accordance with the practice suggested in
Hughes v. Miller, 192 Pa. 365, we remit the record of the common pleas with leave to reinstate the rule for a new trial, in
order that judgment may be entered thereon as law and right
require."
This case does not present the difficulties of the three cases
previously discussed, because of the very significant action of
reinstating the rule for a new trial. But it is the only one of the
four in which such action could be thken, as in the others there
does not appear to have been a rule for a new trial pending.
So far as the general discussion is concerned, then, no appropriate comment can be made upon this case, other than to point
out that the reference to Hughes v. Miller is hardly justified by
the actual practice laid down in that case. Where the rule for a
new trial is not disposed of, the proper practice, of course, is to
reverse the judgment n. o. v. with a procedendo.7
While the situation, therefore remains unchanged, it must be
admitted that the important matter in this connection is the fact
that the practice is settled, and however interesting the reasons
on which it is based may be, a discussion of them is open to the
'Bond v. R. R., 218 Pa. 34 (i9o7) ; Dalmas v. Kemble, 215 Pa. 410 (i9o6).
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charge of being to a certain extent academic. It may be prudent
therefore, and perhaps more profitable, to turn to a subject which
is far from settled and in which a discussion may possibly be suggestive of practical results.
II.

AMENDMENTS.

There are few questions of more practical importance than
the right to amend when it has been discovered that the wrong
parties have been sued, or that the proper kind of action has not
been brought. Years ago the rules in this connection were very
well settled, and the danger of technical mistakes in the institution of proceedings was very real. In fact, the ends of justice
were not infrequently defeated. As recently as 1903, the writer
was associated as junior in a case in which the defendant was
sued as an individual, and upon his proving at the trial that his
business had been incorporated, and that the letters "Inc." should
have been inserted after his name on the writ, the court instructed
the jury to find a verdict for the defendant. As the statute of
limitations had run, no amendment was allowed, and the plaintiff, who had a serious claim against the defendant, was prevented from ever having it tried by a court and jury.
The more recent cases, however, of our Superior and Supreme Courts have gone very far the other way. Indeed they
have gone so far that the question as to when and what kind of
amendments will be allowed is at present quite unsettled, and the
principle that it is more important to have a rule settled than how
it is settled seems to be almost forgotten.
As usually happens, the breaking away from technicalities
was begun by statutory enactment, and amendments "at any
stage of the proceedings" where the names of parties had beer!
erroneously stated, or there had been some mistake in the form
of action, were successively authorized by the Acts of April 16,
1846, P. L. 353; May 5, 1852, P. L. 574; April 12, 1858, P. L.
243; May io, 1871, P. L. 265 and March 14, 1872, P. L. 25.
These statutes were the outgrowth of the Act of March 21, 18o6,8
a4 Sin. Laws (Pa.),

325.
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which gave to a plaintiff the right to amend any informalities in
his pleadings before or during trial.
But the power to allow amendments does"not depend upon
statutes alone. Every court of record has at common law such
a power. The difference is that at common law the amendment
is a matter within the discretion of the court, while under the statute it is a matter of right.9 Even where the amendment is a
matter of right, however, it can only be obtained by leave of
court.10 The real importance of the statutes on amendments lay
in the fact that by making what had previously been discretionary a matter of right, the granting or refusing of statutory
amendments became reviewable upon a writ of error. The rule
seems now to have become even broader, and the refusal of any
"proper amendment" may be made the subject of an appeal."
As early as 1888,12 the Supreme Court said upon this subject: "The effect of our statutes has been to give more prominence
to the trial of the cause on its intrinsic merits in the interest of
the rational and speedy administration of justice, than to the
exact and precise observance of the artificial forms originally
devised for this purpose, but which are supposed, in some instances, at least, to defeat rather than to promote the ends of
justice," showing that at that time the tendency toward liberality
was already well under way but, even in that case, the court
reiterated what they referred to "as the cardinal rule adhered to
in all cases, that the amendment must not introduce a cause of
action substantially different," so that twenty years ago the only
question for the court to decide was whether the amendment
introduced a new cause of action.
Thus, where a writ of summons had been issued in trespass
when the pracipe called for a writ in assumpsit, or vice versa,
the court allowed the writ to be amended as a matter of course.1 3
So the form of the action could be changed if the change
were one of form only and did not affect the substance. A suit
'Rhoads v. Commonwealth, I5 Pa 276 (i85o).
"Covey v. R. R., 6 Lack. Jur. 45; Wigton v. R. R., 25 W. N. C. 357 (1889).
'See Todd v. Ins. Co., 9 Pa. Super. Ct. 381, in which there is an interesting review of the decisions in the opinion of Judge Orlady.
'Erie v. Barber, 1I8 Pa. 6 (1888).
"Gould v. Gage, II8 Pa..559 (i888).
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in assumpsit for money had and received was allowed to be
changed to one in trespass for deceit, as both actions were supported by the same statement of facts. In this case 14 the statute
of limitations had run but as the cause of action was held not to
be changed, the statute was held not to apply.
Turning to some of the more recent cases, we find it declared in Holmes v. R. R., 220 Pa. 189 (i908), that the general

rule is that no new cause of action shall be introduced, and no
new parties brought in after the statute of limitations has becoMe a bar. In passing, as an illustration of what is not held by
the court to be a new cause of action, reference may be made to
the case. of Schmelz~r v. Traction Co., 218 Pa. 29 (1907), in

which the plaintiff's first statement averred that the defendant's
car did not stop, and she was subsequently allowed to amend her
statement at the trial of the case by averring that the car did stop,
but not long enough for her to get off. If an amendment is a
matter of grace, it would seem that this plaintiff must have found
the court in an exceptionally gracious mood.
It must be borne in mind that the general rule has always
been that no amendment will be allowed which introduces a new
cause of action or substantially varies the original case. This is
important, as the more recent cases so frequently use the expression that no new cause of action may be introduced after the statute of limitations has run, that counsel may be easily misled into
believing that a new cause of action may be introduced before
the statute is run. Such, however, is not the case.", Thus the
statement is made in La.ne v. Wdter Co., 220 Pa. 599 (i9O8),
that -a new cause of action cannot be introduced, or new parties
brought in, or a new subject matter be presented, or a fatal or
material defect in the pleadings be corrected after the statute of
limitations has become a bar." It certainly seems that a fair
argument could be made from this case in support of the view
that any of these things could be done before the statute became
a bar.
Again, and even more recently,' 6 it has been decided that
" Smith v. Bellows, 77 Pa. 441 (875).,

McNair v. Compton, 35 Pa. 23 (1859).
" Crum v. R. R., 226 Pa. 151 (19IO).
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amendments may be asked for at any time from the day the writ
is issued until the day the judgment is satisfied, and where the
amendment is such as to bring into operation the statute of limitations, the objiection to the amendment on this ground must be
made at the time it is asked for, or the amendment will be sustained. And if the objection to the'amendment is overruled, the
defendant must except to the order of the court allowing the
amendment and assign the action of -the court as error, in order
to raise the question of the propriety of the amendment on appeal.
It is not easy to reconcile the cases. At the time of the last
decision, and only two years after Lane v. Water Company,
supra, the Supreme Court said that the right to add the name of a
party by way of amendment after the expiration of the statutory
period was no longer an open question, and allowed the husband
to join his wife in an action for the death of their son over a year
after the suit was brought. [Sontum v. Ry. Co., 226 Pa. 230.]
And in McArdle v. Railway, 41 Pa. Superior Ct. I6z (19o9), in
which a suit was brought by a husband to recover damages for
the negligent killing of his wife, without setting forth in his
statement of claim the names of the children, as required by the
act of 1855,1' the court allowed the statement to be amended
in this particular after a verdict had been rendered, and although
the statute of limitations had intervened.
On the other hand, in Martin v. Railway, 227 Pa. 18 (I9iO),
the court seems to have returned to stand upon the ancient ways.
This case makes an interesting comparison with Schmelzer v.
Traction Company,' 8 supra, where the plaintiff appears to have
come close to an averment of a different kind of negligence in her
amended statement. In the Martin case 19 the plaintiff's first
statement alleged that the defendant's car was run at an excessive
speed, and no warning was given of its approach. Over a year
later the plaintiff asked leave to file an amended statement, charging as negligence a premature start. At the trial, the allegations
in the original statement were shown to be without foundation in
"Act of April 25, 1855,
"218 Pa. 29 (1907).

P. L. 309.

"Martin v. Railway, 227 Pa. 18 (igio).
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fact, and although the plaintiff secured a large verdict, the court
subsequently entered judgment for the defendant n..o. v., on the
ground that the amended statement should not have been allowed,
and that on the original statement the plaintiff had shown no case.
The Supreme Court affirmed this action of the court below, saying:
"The plaintiff proved herself out of court on the original
statement. Can this situation be cured by amended statement
setting up an entirely different theory after the statute of limiations had become a bar? All of our cases -hold that this cannot be done if a new cause of action be introduced by the amended
statement. * * * It is not therefore a case of adding to or
amplifying the original statement within the rule recognized in
some of our cases. * * * In the original statement the standard of care was the duty owed by the street railway company to
a person not an intending passenger at the street corner. In the
amended statement the relation of common carrier and passenger
is set up, and the standard of care required in protecting an intending passenger when getting on the car is relied on."
If the plaintiff in this case actually had a just claim against
the defendant on the facts set up in the amended statement, as
the jury by their verdict appear to have found that she had, it
would seem as though this decision might mark the beginning of
a possible reactionary movement on the part of the Supreme
Court.

20

It is important to note in passing that this case 19 also decides
that the defendant in an action in trespass does not have to plead
the statute of limitations in order to defeat the plaintiff's claim on
this ground. That the action was not brought within the statutory time may be shown by the record, or by evidence introduced
at the trial, under the general plea of "not guilty." It is not clear
just how this affects the ruling in Crum v. Railway, 226 Pa. ii
(I9io), that an objection to an amendment on the ground of the
statute of limitations must be made at the time the amendment
is asked for, or the amendment will be sustained.
It is, perhaps, inevitable that in the many cases dealing with
2°

See also Coyne v. Railway,

227

Pa. 496 (19io).
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the question of amendments there should be a certain amount of
inconsistency in the decisions. Thus, in Jamesson v. Capron, 95
Pa. 15 (IOI), the heir was allowed to be substituted for the
personal representative, while in Wildermuth v. Long, 196 Pa.
54, (i9oo), the substitution of the heir for the administrator
was not allowed.
Again, in several other cases, amendments have been allowed
changing the names of parties who have been entered as individuals so as to make them appear in their representative capacity, as
21
from A to A, Administrator of B, deceased; A, Trustee, &c.
But in a recent case 22 the substitution of a widow as administratrix, as plaintiff in an action she had brought in her own
name, was not allowed. In this decision the Supreme Court distinctly say that the substitution of the widow as administratrix
for the widow as an individual would introduce a new cause of
action.
The Court attempted to reconcile the various cases by laying down, in Holmes v. R. R. Co., 220 Pa. 189 (i9o8), the
somewhat elastic rule that, where the rights of a party are likely
to be defeated by having too few or too many as plaintiffs or defendants (and, inferentially by having made any other mistake
in the pleadings), amendments that would not deprive the opposite party of any right will be allowed, citing Booth v. Dorsey,
202 Pa. 381 (1902).
There is no rule, however, that will satisfactorily reconcile
all the cases on this point. On the whole, it may be said that our
Pennsylvania decisions have gone very far toward allowing
amendments. In two recent cases; amendments were allowed
changing the name of the defendant from "a corporation of
Pennsylvania" to "a corporation.of the State of Maryland," even
though the statute of limitations had run, 23 and changing the
name of a corporation defendant, permitting it to be sued as an
unincorporated association. 2 4

While in Dulaney v. Ry. Co., 228

"Weikel v. Bockel, 4 Walk. (Pa.) 336 (i874); Boas v. Christ, 20 Pa. C.
C. 196 (1897); Clifford v. Ins. Co., 161 Pa. 257 (1894).
'Le Barr v. R. R. Co., 218 Pa. 261 (i9o7).
Meitzner v. Ry. Co., 224 Pa. 352 (1909).
"Central Printing House v. Board of Trade, 18 Pa. Dist. R io8o (19o9).
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Pa. i8o (I9iO), suit was brought against the defendant as a corporation, and on proof that it was not a corporation, the plaintiff
was allowed to amend by bringing in all the railway companies
that composed the defendant association, and as service was secured on only one of these companies, the suit proceeded to trial,
and judgment was entered, against that company alone. This decision seems to be the last step taken along the line of earlier
cases allowing suits by or against a partnership to be amended so
as to bring in new partners,2 5 and allowing amendments to change
corporations to partnerships and partnerships to corporations. 28
A careful consideration of many authorities on this subject
leads to the conclusion that it is difficult, in any given case, to
know just when the pleadings can and when they cannot be
amended. Perhaps the only safe rule is for counsel desiring the
amendment to ask for it, and counsel on the other side to oppose it. A careful search through the digests will doubtless supply each advocate with an excellent authority to sustain his position. If the amendment is allowed, the opposite party may, of
course, plead surprise and secure a continuance. This is certainly so when the suit has been brought against joint tort-feasors, and after the evidence has failed to show any concert of
action, and the plaintiff has amended his statement by changing
it from one charging a joint tort to one for a several liability,
or has discontinued his action as to one of the defendants, 2 7 or
has changed the form of action, 28 and is presumably true in the
case of any amendment, Where the form of action has been
changed, the defendant may not only secure a continuance, but,
by the Act of' May io, 1871, P. L. 265, may require the adverse
party to pay all costs up to the time of amendment.
From all the cases two tendencies emerge. One is to hold
parties rather strictly to the rules of pleading and to allow only
such amendments as are authorized by statute and affect merely
=McGlynn v. Johnson, i W. N. C. (Pa.) 312 (1875); Bold v. Harrison,
I W. N. C. (Pa.) 154 (1874). '
2Lippincott, 2 W. N. C. (Pa.) i86 (1875); Delaware, &c., Co. v. Curren,
24 Pa. C. C. 5o5 (I90I) ; Nurr v. Slaymaker, 14 Lanc. L. R 366 (897).
"'Sturzebecker v. Traction Co., 211 Pa. 156 (igo5).
-Taylor v. Hanlon, 103 Pa. 5o4 (1883).
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the form of action. The other is to allow the parties great leeway, and, where substantial justice can be secured only by an
amendment, to permit the same, even though the statute of limitations may have run, and regardless of the fact that the technical cause of action may be, to a certain extent, changed.
Two recent illustrations of these conflicting tendencies may
be cited. In Shimp v. Gray, 41 Pa. Super. Ct. 542 (i909), the Superior Court held that after a rule for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense had been discharged by the lower court and an
.appeal taken, the defendant could not be permitted to file a supplemental affidavit containing facts discovered subsequently to
the appeal. On the other hand, in Wood v. Kerkeslager, 227 Pa.
536 (I9IO), the Supreme Court ruled that after an affidavit of
defense had been held good by the court below, but insufficient
on appeal, the defendant might be permitted to file a supplemental affidavit, even after the return of the record, if it set up
material and after-discovered facts. [It may be suggested that
the better practice would be to require the defendant to set out
his after-discovered facts in a petition to open the judgment.]
The first tendency above referred to would seem perhaps, in
the long run, to be more conducive of an orderly and expeditious
conduct of litigation; for while it is but natural to wish justice
done in the individual case, yet, until we have reached the ideal
state where justice will be exactly administered, there must always be some cases in which there is a failure. In the meantime,
litigants must depend upon their own efforts and the aid of fal
lible counsel, and even though mistakes occur, the interests of
litigants in general will be best preserved by definite and settled
rules of procedure.
Perhaps the fairest statement of the attitude of the Supreme
Court on the whole subject appears in Wright v. Eureka, &c., Co.,
2o6 Penna. 274, as follows:

"Statutes on amendments are liberally construed to give effect to their clearly defined intent to prevent a defeat of justice
through a mere mistake as to parties or the form of action.
Amendments, however, will not be allowed to the prejudice of
the other party where the statute of limitations has run, by in-
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troducing a new cause of action or bringing in a new party, or
changing the'capacity in which he is sued. A party whose name
it is asked to amend must be in court. If the effect of the amendment will be to correct the name under which the right party was
sued, it should be allowed; if its effect will be to bring a new
party on the record, it should be refused after the running of the
statute of limitations."
While this language is used more particularly in reference
to a change of names, it undoubtedly ;nay be considered as applying to amendments in general, and fairly warrants the statement that the present attitude of our Supreme Court is that as
amendments in general are discretionary, they should be allowed
if they work no injustice to the opposite party. If this may fairly
be considered the general rule, it is apparent that each individual
case will have to be decided upon its own merits.
Henry B. Patton.
Philadelphia, Pa.

